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A discussion on why the swing direction is more important than where the mallet head is pointing. Just use it to tack against the direction in which the Earth is travelling, gradually slowing its orbital velocity and increasing the orbit's eccentricity, until the orbit passes within the Roche limit where the Earth is torn apart by tidal forces. This results in a minute theoretical acceleration but over millions of years the velocity would accumulate to something substantial. During our boyhood our parents tried to distinguish us more obviously by our clothing and other simple devices, but we would so frequently exchange suits and otherwise circumvent the enemy that they abandoned all such ineffectual attempts, and during all the years that we lived together at home everybody recognized the difficulty of the situation and made the best of it by calling us both "Jehnry." I have often wondered at my father's forbearance in not branding us conspicuously upon our unworthy brows, but as we were tolerably good boys and used our power of embarrassment and annoyance with commendable moderation, we escaped the iron. More discussion on Sextuple Leaves. Hume’s discussion of necessary connection presented above. The realist interpretation then applies this to Hume’s account of necessary connection, holding that it is not Hume’s telling us what causation is, but only what we can know of it.

Since we have some notion of causation, necessary connection, and so forth, his Copy Principle demands that this idea must be traceable to impressions. The general proposal is that we can and do have two different levels of clarity when contemplating a particular notion. Among other things, he argues for a novel way to square the two definitions of cause. The hour was late and the square deserted. In the external world, causation simply is the regularity of constant conjunction. In fact, Hume must reject this inference, since he does not believe a resemblance thesis between perceptions and external objects can ever be philosophically established. However, there are philosophers (Max Black, R. B. Braithwaite, Charles Peirce, and Brian Skyrms, for instance) that, while agreeing that Hume targets the justification of inductive inference, insist that this particular justificatory circle is not vicious or that it is unproblematic for various reasons. Garrett 1997: 92, 94) Similarly, David Owen holds that Hume’s Problem of induction is not an argument against the reasonableness of inductive inference, but, "Rather Hume is arguing that reason cannot explain how we come to have beliefs in the unobserved on the basis of past experience." (Owen 1999: 6) We see that there are a variety of interpretations of Hume’s Problem of induction and, as we will see below, how we interpret the Problem will inform how we interpret his ultimate causal position.

Of these, two are distinctions which realist interpretations insist that Hume respects in a crucial way but that non-realist interpretations often deny. D. C. Stove maintains that, while Hume argues that inductive inference never adds probability to its conclusion, Hume’s premises actually only support "inductive fallibilism", a much weaker position that induction can never attain certainty (that is, that the inferences are never valid). See, for instance, Beauchamp and Rosenberg 1981: 11, Goodman 1983: 60, Mounce 1999: 42, Noonan 1999: 140-145, Ott 2009: 224 or Wilson 1997: 16) Of course while this second type of reductionist agrees that the projectivist component should be included, there is less agreement as to how, precisely, it is supposed to fit into Hume’s overall causal picture. However, it is not reason that justifies us, but rather instinct (and reason, in fact, is a subspecies of instinct for Hume, implying that at least some instinctual faculties are fit for doxastic assent). Tooley 1987: 246-47) The case for Humean causal realism is the least intuitive, given the explications above, and will therefore require the most explanation. It simply separates what we can know from what is the case. Therefore, whether or not the projectivism of D2 actually is relevant to the metaphysics of causation, a strong case can be made that Hume thinks it is so, and therefore an accurate historical interpretation needs to include D2 in order to capture Hume’s intentions.

Therefore, another interpretation of this "solution" is that Hume thinks we can be justified in making causal inferences. This undercuts the reductionist interpretation. Further, it smoothes over worries about consistency arising from the fact that Hume seemingly undercuts all rational belief in causation, but then merrily shrugs off the Problem and continues to invoke causal reasoning throughout his writings. In other words, rather than interpreting Hume’s insights about the tenuousness of our idea of causation as representing an ontological reduction of what causation is, Humean causal skepticism can instead be viewed as his clearly demarcating the limits of our knowledge in this area and then tracing out the ramifications of this limiting. T 1.3.2.11; SBN 77) In short, a reduction to D1 ignores the mental determination component. First, there are reductionists that insist Hume reduces causation to nothing beyond constant conjunction, that is, the reduction is to a simple naïve regularity theory of causation, and therefore the mental projection of D2 plays no part. In fact, the defender of this brand of regularity theory of causation is generally labeled a "Humean" about causation. The unifying thread of the reductionist interpretations is that causation, as it exists in the object, is constituted by regularity.

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